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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. Whether the trial court was correct in ruling that the 
decision made by UDOT to utilize barrels instead of concrete 
barriers for traffic separation as part of its Traffic Control Plan 
was a discretionary act, rendering UDOT immune from suit under the 
discretionary function exception of the Governmental Immunity Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1). R. 413-423, 912-919, 1033-1035. 
II. Whether the plaintiffs' allegation that UDOT negligently 
failed to reduce the speed limit in the construction zone require 
reversal of the order granting UDOT summary judgment, where the 
plaintiffs did not produce any evidence showing that the speed 
limit had any relationship to the accident. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving party 
is, nevertheless, entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Warren 
v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992); Transamerica 
v. Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P.2d 24, 25 
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(Utah 1990) . The Utah Supreme Court reviews for correctness the 
legal conclusions of the trial court. Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 
1251 (Utah 1997); Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102 (Utah 
1992) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 (1993 repl. vol.) 
Unless the injury arises out of one or more of the 
exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10, 
immunity from suit is waived for any injury caused by a 
defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition, of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, 
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure located on 
them. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1993 repl. vol.) 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act 
or omission of an employee committed within the scope of 
employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function, whether or 
not the discretion is abused; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee UDOT adopts appellants' statement of the case insofar 
as it sets forth the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, 
and the disposition in the court below. Pursuant to appellate rule 
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24(b)(1), UDOT submits only an additional "statement of facts." 
This action arose from a head-on collision that occurred on 
Interstate 84 in Weber County on September 24, 1995, when a west-
bound pickup truck driven by Scott Griffin crossed over the center 
line and collided with the plaintiffs' eastbound recreational 
vehicle. R. 389-390. The accident took place at approximately 
milepost 108, in a construction zone. Id. As a result of the 
accident, the plaintiffs were injured. R. 390. 
At the time the accident occurred, 1-84 was being resurfaced 
under federally funded State Project IM-84-6(70)102 in an area 
approximately from milepost 102 to approximately milepost 112, for 
a length of just over ten miles. R. 425. In connection with the 
project, UDOT had to completely reconstruct both eastbound and 
westbound sides of the Interstate. R. 408, 1826-28. While one 
side was being rebuilt, the traffic was routed on the opposite 
side, requiring a two-way two-lane operation ("TWTLO"). R. 408. 
The UDOT design team, in accordance with Federal Regulations 
and Guidelines set forth in Roadside Design Guide of the American 
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 
("AASHTO") and the Manual on Uniform Traffic Code Devices 
("MUTCD"), considered the best way of separating the opposing lanes 
of traffic. The initial Traffic Control Plan design was drafted by 
Jim Thompson, Design Engineer, Bruce Swenson, UDOT Regional and 
Design Engineer, and supervisor Mr. Thompson. R. 1817, 1818, 1822, 
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1826. This plan was considered in multiple reviews and was 
ultimately decided upon. R. 409. 
As with all proposed road projects, UDOT undertakes a detailed 
process in designing, reviewing and approving traffic controlled 
design for construction projects. This process was followed in the 
drafting, formulation and approval of the plans for the 1-84 
project. In connection with UDOT's preparation and drafting of its 
preliminary design plans for 1-84 construction project, an initial 
preliminary meeting, called the Scoping Meeting, was held to 
determine the parameters of the project. The Scoping Meeting for 
1-84 was held on or about July 16, 1993. Those in attendance 
include Federal Highway Administration officials, UDOT maintenance, 
engineering, design and administrative personnel, and affected City 
and County officials. R. 410, 448-52, 1858-59, 1910-13. General 
safety issues on the construction project were discussed and 
hazards were identified during this Scoping meeting. Id. 
Additional studies, including level of service and traffic 
volumes, were made by UDOT during January 1994. R. 410. Following 
the initial Scoping meeting the preliminary draft of the plans was 
prepared, and a "plan-in-hand" review was held on the project on or 
about June 22, 1994. Again, various representatives from UDOT as 
well as Federal Highway Administration attended this meeting. R. 
411, 108-09, 463-70, 1886-87, 1898. Following the plan-in-hand 
meeting, comments of the group were addressed and quantities for 
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the project were calculated by the same group of engineers and UDOT 
representatives. R. at 412, 462-70, 1898-1900. 
These reviews were followed by a PS&E Meeting (Plans, Special 
Provisions and Estimates) wherein the plans, special provisions and 
estimates were reviewed page-by-page. The same number of engineers 
were involved in this process as well. R. at 412, 1914-16. After 
completion of the PS&E Meeting, a final review was done. Two sets 
of the plans were then distributed: one plan went to the Division 
of Safety, and one to the project engineer to ensure that they 
concurred with all aspects of the plans. (R. at 412, 1915.) 
Federal Highway Administration representatives were involved 
from the very beginning, including Tom Allen and Don Kilmore. 
Three Federal Highway Engineers reviewed the 1-84 project before it 
sent out to bid. Once it was completed, the Federal Highway Admin-
istration signed off on the project to allow to go out for adver-
tisement for bid. It is not possible to have a federally funded 
project, which this was, to go out for bid unless there has been 
federal approval. R. at 412, 482, 1916-18. 
In designing the project, UDOT looked to MUTCD, the standard 
of the industry. Under Part VI, Standards and Guides for Traffic 
Controls for Street and Highway Construction, Maintenance, Utility, 
and Incident Management Operations (1988 edition, Revision 3, 
September 3, 1993), certain issues must be reviewed in order to 
determine whether a TWTLO should be included in a traffic control 
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plan. R. 420-21, 438-46. When maintained on a roadway of a 
normally divided highway, the MUTCD requires that opposing traffic 
be separated "either with portable barriers (concrete safety-shape 
or approved alternate), or with channelizing devices throughout the 
length of the TLTWO." R. 421, 442. Barrels are considered proper 
channelizing devises which can be used at the discretion of highway 
departments, including UDOT. R. at 421, 22, 72-73.) 
There are many reasons why barrels may be chosen instead of 
barriers for a highway construction project. In fact, while there 
are many reasons to use barriers, there are just as many reasons 
not to use them. Barriers reduce a driver's recovery area, making 
accidents more likely. Furthermore, barriers preclude emergency 
vehicles from getting to the other side. They also have a 
beginning and end. These require attenuators which can be hit and 
cause substantial collision. Barriers also retain water and keep 
it from running off roadways, which can cause icy conditions in 
cold weather. They also create canyon-like effects, reducing the 
margin for error even further. They are also more costly and more 
difficult to move. It is significant to note that the Federal 
Highway Administration, who approved and funded the project, never 
required barriers or asked that they be considered. R. 1992-96, 
2005. 
Plaintiffs' own expert, Thomas Alcorn, admitted that he had no 
way to determine what caused the truck driver to veer off to the 
-6-
right of the road before he then lost control and crossed over the 
center line to cause the accident. When asked if he would admit 
that he would "merely be speculating . . . that speed was one of 
the factors that caused him to drive off the shoulder", Mr. Alcorn 
stated as follows: 
A. A little more than speculation. It's very 
characteristic of our highways throughout the country as 
a causal factor in single vehicle, run-off-the-road 
accidents on the outside of a curb. 
Q. But you're making a general statement, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it's not based on any particular facts or 
investigation in this case? 
A. I agree. 
R. at 2269-70.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly granted UDOT summary judgment on the 
basis of discretionary function immunity for its decision to use 
barrels as the traffic separation method in the construction zone. 
This decision was arrived at after weighing several policy factors. 
The plaintiffs allege that UDOT should have utilized concrete 
barriers instead, but barriers themselves carry significant risks 
of their own, and UDOT's personnel decided that, on balance, 
barrels were the preferred method. This is exactly the sort of 
decision the discretionary function exception was intended to 
protect. 
In a recent case, the Utah Supreme Court held that UDOT' s 
choice as to the height of a concrete median barrier was protected 
by discretionary function immunity. But if the choice as to the 
height of the barrier is discretionary, then so too is the choice 
as to whether to use a barrier in the first place. 
The plaintiffs have raised several minor arguments as to why 
the discretionary function immunity exception does not apply in 
this case. But these arguments are uniformly meritless. The 
Governmental Immunity Act does not require that the government 
agency consult specific written studies in making its decision. 
Nor does the Act require the government to provide evidence that 
all aspects of the specific question were discussed at the highest-
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level meetings. Rather, discretionary immunity depends on the 
nature of the decision being made, and whether that decision 
involves the weighing of policy considerations. Further, UDOT did 
not have any regulations requiring the use of concrete barriers, 
and the choice to use barrels cannot be dismissed as a merely 
"operational" decision, carrying out the "policy" decision to 
construct the freeway. Finally, because the decision not to 
initially use barriers was discretionary, so too was the decision 
not to install those barriers after the project began. 
The court was also correct in granting summary judgment on the 
claim that UDOT allegedly negligently failed to reduce the speed 
limit in the construction zone. There was no evidence that the 
speed limit had anything to do with the accident at issue. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
UDOT IS IMMUNE UNDER THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION FROM 
CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM ITS CHOICE OF BARRELS OVER 
BARRIERS TO SEPARATE TRAFFIC IN THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE. 
Section 63-3 0-8 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act provides 
that government entities are immune from suit for allegedly 
defective highways if "the injury arises out of one or more of the 
exceptions to waiver set forth in Section 63-30-10." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-8. Section 63-30-10 further provides that immunity is 
not waived "if the injury arises out of: [%] (1) the exercise or 
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performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function, whether or not the discretion is abused." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(1) (1993 repl. vol.).1 In our case, the plaintiffs' 
injuries allegedly resulted from UDOT's use of barrels as 
channelizing devices in its traffic control plan for the Weber 
Canyon Freeway Reconstruction Project. This decision obviously 
arose out of the exercise of a discretionary function. Therefore, 
UDOT is immune from suit, and the trial court correctly granted 
summary judgment. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a four-part test to 
determine whether a decision or act qualifies for the discretionary 
function exception: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision 
necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, program, 
or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission or decision 
essential to the realization or accomplishment of that 
policy, program or objective as opposed to one which 
would not change the course or direction of the policy, 
program or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the 
exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and 
expertise on the part of the governmental agency 
involved? 
(4) Does the government agency involved possess the 
requisite authority to make the act or omission? 
1Section 63-30-10 was amended in 1996. It now provides that 
immunity is not waived for an injury that "arises out of, in 
connection with, or resulting from" the exercise of a discretionary 
function. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1997 repl. vol.). 
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Keeaan v. State, 896 P.2d 618, 624 (Utah 1995) (quoting Little v. 
Utah State Div. Of Family Servs. , 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 1983)). 
The decision to choose barrels rather than concrete barriers as a 
channelizing method was an exercise of UDOT's discretion, because 
the decision required the weighing of several considerations 
involving safety and other important policy matters. UDOT was 
faced with a difficult choice between two traffic separation 
methods, each of which posed its own dangers. It was UDOT's 
responsibility to make that choice. And once it made that choice, 
its decision should not be second-guessed. 
A. Utah law provides that fundamental highway design 
decisions are immune from attack under the discretionary 
function exception to the waiver of governmental 
immunity. 
In a recent case remarkably similar to our own, the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that UDOT's decisions regarding highway 
barrier design are discretionary functions which may not form the 
basis for governmental liability. Keegan, 896 P. 2d 618. In 
Keecran, the plaintiff's husband was killed on 1-80 in Parley's 
Canyon when his car skidded on black ice, climbed the concrete 
median barrier, and slid along the barrier, crashing into a bridge 
support pillar. The plaintiff alleged that although the concrete 
barrier had originally been built in compliance with the relevant 
safety standards, two subsequent surface overlay projects had 
raised the road level, effectively reducing the height of the 
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barrier to below the standard. The supreme court held that UDOT's 
decision not to raise the barrier during the overlay projects was 
discretionary, and that the trial court had erred in denying UDOT's 
summary judgment motion. 
The court explained that all four of the elements set forth 
above were satisfied by UDOT's decision to keep the concrete 
barrier. First, the decision involved a "basic governmental objec-
tive: to wit, public safety on the roads." Id. at 624. The court 
noted that a safety studies engineer had concluded that not raising 
the barrier would not have an adverse impact on safety. Second, 
the decision was essential to the realization of that policy, as 
the decision "involved a determination of not only the degree of 
safety that would be provided by the various options considered, 
but also what degree of safety would be an appropriate goal given 
time and cost constraints." Id. Third, the decision involved the 
exercise of basic policy judgment and expertise of the agency. And 
fourth, UDOT had the authority to make the decision. See also 
Duncan v. Union Pacific R. Co., 842 P.2d 832, 835 (Utah 1992) 
(decision not to upgrade warning devices at dangerous railroad 
crossing was immune as discretionary because the decision involved 
weighing competing policy concerns); Rocky Mountain Thrift v. Salt 
Lake City, 784 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 1989) (design of City Creek 
flood control system discretionary because it required evaluation 
of a myriad of factors). 
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B. UDOT's choice of barrels to provide traffic separation 
constitutes the exercise of a discretionary function. 
1. The four-factor test shows that the choice to use 
barrels is covered by the discretionary function 
immunity. 
Keegan controls our case. If UDOT's decision regarding the 
height of a concrete barrier constitutes the exercise of a 
discretionary function, then so does the decision whether to use a 
concrete barrier in the first place. Further, the four-element 
test is also satisfied, for the same reasons as in Keegan. The 
choice of the proper traffic separation method in our case involved 
the same policy objective as in Keegan: highway safety. Thus, the 
first element is met. Moreover, just as in Keegan, the second 
element of the test is satisfied because the decision was essential 
to the realization of that policy. That is, UDOT's decision to use 
barrels clearly "involved a determination of . . . the degree of 
safety that would be provided by the various options considered." 
Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624. 
The third element is met because the decision involved UDOT's 
basic policy judgment and expertise. As explained in the statement 
of facts, the Traffic Control Plan was evaluated in great detail by 
committees of UDOT personnel and was reviewed by federal highway 
experts. Such evaluation happened on various levels, through the 
initial scoping meeting, the preliminary drafting of the plan, the 
Plan-in-Hand Meeting, the PS&E meeting, and the final review of 
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plans. At all levels of this intensive process, the people and 
committees utilized their judgment and expertise, and applied broad 
policy factors in arriving at the final plan for the resurfacing of 
1-84, including the Traffic Control Plan. Fourth, UDOT obviously-
had the authority to make the decision, as it did in Keegan. 
In fact, the argument for discretionary function immunity is 
actually more compelling in our case than in Keegan. In Keegan, 
there were no safety reasons favoring the use of the inadequate 
barrier. Thus, the choice in that case came down to safety versus 
money and inconvenience. But in our case, not only would barriers 
have increased the cost and inconvenience, but UDOT also had to 
weigh safety considerations on both sides of the equation. 
Barriers increase the risk of accidents in several ways. A 
barrier severely limits a driver's "recovery area," so a driver who 
swerves a few feet will most likely hit the barrier, which is a 
"rather significant collision." Deposition of David Kennison, R. 
1993:23 - 1994:18. Without barriers, however, a driver may be able 
to recorrect and to return to the proper lane of travel. Id. 
Additionally, because a barrier was already in place on the right-
hand side of one of the travel lanes, putting another barrier in 
the middle would have created a "canyon" effect in that lane. This 
would have increased the risk of accidents even more, as it would 
have left very little room for error on either side. Id. R. 
1995:4-10, 2005:13-24. Barriers on both sides also increase the 
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likelihood of a major pileup after an accident. Id. 1995:8-10. 
Further, one can imagine the havoc that even one stalled vehicle 
could wreak if all the traffic in one direction were channeled into 
one lane with barrier on both sides. 
Barriers can pose other hazards as well. As demonstrated by 
Keegan itself, vehicles can climb up onto barriers, and fatalities 
can result. Barriers can even cause some vehicles to roll over. 
Swenson Deposition, R. 1824:25 - 1825:8. Further, barriers must 
have a beginning and an end, and they can require attenuators that 
can cause accidents. Kennison Deposition, R. 1994:22-25. Barriers 
reduce water's ability to run off, which can create icy conditions 
in cold weather. Id. R. 1995:1-3. Once again, Keegan demonstrates 
the potential consequences of such a situation. Finally, barriers 
interfere with the ability of emergency vehicles to reach the scene 
of an accident, which can further increase the risks to drivers and 
passengers. Id. R. 1994:19 - 22; Swenson Deposition R. 1826:8-13. 
2. Discretionary function immunity is proper 
regardless of whether UDOT consulted written 
studies. 
The plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Keegan by claiming that 
UDOT did not use written safety reports in its determination as to 
whether to use barrels or barriers as a traffic separation method. 
But this contention fails. First, UDOT did consider written 
accident reports, traffic studies, etc., in creating and deciding 
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upon the Traffic Control Plan. Level of service and traffic volume 
studies were made and considered, R. 454-59, as was an Operational 
Safety Report. R. 461. But more importantly, the Governmental 
Immunity Act does not require written studies for the discretionary 
function exception to apply. Government employees make hundreds of 
discretionary decisions every year, and certainly not all of these 
decisions are supported by written studies. 
The question under the Act is whether the plaintiffs' injuries 
arose out of the exercise of a discretionary function, not what 
particular materials were used by the governmental entity in 
performing that function. And the plaintiffs have not cited any 
cases that would allow them to get around the discretionary 
function immunity by claiming that the decisionmaking process was 
inadequate. Further, to allow the plaintiffs to do so here would 
eviscerate the discretionary function exception. 
The whole purpose of the discretionary function exception is 
to protect legislative and administrative policy decisions from 
second-guessing by the judicial system; this purpose would be 
thwarted if the materials used in the decisionmaking itself were 
subject to such attack. For instead of arguing that a decision was 
negligent, plaintiffs could simply argue that the decisionmaking 
was negligent. See, e.g., Myslakowski v. United States, 806 F.2d 
94, 97 (6th Cir. 1986) ("even the negligent failure of a 
discretionary government policymaker to consider all relevant 
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aspects of a subject matter under consideration does not vitiate 
the discretionary character of the decision that was made"). 
3. Immunity is not precluded by the lack of 
documentation that the barrels-versus-barriers 
choice was discussed at multiple levels. 
Plaintiffs further claim that Keegan cannot apply because UDOT 
does not have documentary evidence that the barriers-versus-barrels 
decision itself was specifically evaluated at several UDOT levels. 
However, the traffic separation method was an essential part of the 
Traffic Control Plan, and as established above, the entire Plan was 
carefully evaluated, reviewed, and approved at several UDOT levels, 
that no one raised an objection to the use of barrels does not mean 
that no one considered the issue. 
Further, the plaintiffs have not presented any authority 
requiring a government entity to provide evidence that every aspect 
of a discretionary decision was specifically discussed. And 
federal cases hold to the contrary: as long as the decision is of 
a discretionary type, courts will not weigh the adequacy of the 
discussions actually made about that decision. For example, in a 
case quoted with approval in Keegan, the Fourth Circuit explained 
that "rather than requiring a fact-based inquiry into the circum-
stances surrounding the government actor's exercise of a particular 
discretionary function, we are of opinion [sic] that a reviewing 
court in the usual case is to look to the nature of the challenged 
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decision in an objective, or general sense, and ask whether that 
decision is one which we would expect inherently to be grounded in 
considerations of policy.11 Baum v. United States, 986 F.2d 716, 
720-21 (4th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added) (quoted in Keegan, 896 P.2d 
at 625). The Third Circuit has also explained that " [i]n 
determining whether the action of the government involves the 
permissible exercise of policy judgment, we need not examine the 
record for evidence of a conscious policy decision . . . . The 
relevant inquiry is whether the [action] is a matter 'susceptible 
to policy analysis.'M Sea-Land Service v. United States, 919 F.2d 
888, 892 (3d Cir. 1990). 
Moreover, the undisputed evidence establishes that the traffic 
separation methods themselves were discussed and debated in detail 
by experienced engineers with expertise in weighing competing 
policy considerations. The traffic control plan, including the 
choice of channelization method, was initially drafted by Jim 
Thompson, the project design engineer, who had over twenty years of 
experience. Swenson Deposition R. 1817:12 - 21. In fact, Mr. 
Thompson had designed the entire stretch of 1-15 from Tremonton to 
the Idaho state line. Id. R.1819:16-21. Traffic separation 
methods were also discussed with Mr. Bruce Swenson, UDOT's Region 
One Design Engineer, who himself had over twenty-five years exper-
ience with UDOT, R. 1809:23-24, and who has been the design 
engineer for region one since 1985. R. 1812:8-10). In their 
- 1 ft-
discussions, the two engineers discussed options such as barriers, 
double yellow lines, raised curbs, "candlesticks," and vertical 
panels before settling on barrels. R. 1822:20-25, 1825:9-21. 
These discussions are more than sufficient to establish that 
the discretionary function immunity applies here. UDOT notes that 
discretionary function immunity is not limited to decisions made by 
strictly high-level employees. Instead, the focus is on the 
decision itself. As the United States Supreme Court has explained, 
"'It is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the 
actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception 
applies in a given case.'" United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 
322 (1991) (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 
813 (1984)) . 
The court should also reject the plaintiffs' contention that 
discretionary function immunity is not available because UDOT did 
not document a high-level decision to "fail to investigate acci-
dents" or to "fail to respond" to concerns raised by a contractor. 
The simple truth is that the plaintiffs' injuries did not result 
from any failure to investigate accidents or any failure to respond 
to a contractor's concerns. Rather, the plaintiffs' injuries 
resulted from the lack of a concrete barrier. And because the 
original use of the barrels as the traffic separation method 
clearly resulted from the exercise of a discretionary function, so 
too did the continued use of those barrels. 
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It would be ludicrous to suggest that an initial decision 
would be protected by the discretionary function immunity, but the 
failure to immediately correct such a decision is not. For, unless 
an accident took place in the first few days after a plan went into 
effect, it would be difficult to determine whether an injury 
resulted from the original decision or the continuation of that 
decision. Moreover, discretionary function immunity applies 
regardless of whether the discretionary function was actually per-
formed. In other words, UDOT obviously did not replace the barrels 
with barriers. Either a choice was made not to replace the 
barrels, which would have been the exercise of a discretionary 
function, or no such choice was made, in which case the injuries 
allegedly arose out of the failure to exercise a discretionary 
function. Either way, the discretionary immunity exception still 
applies. 
In addition, as noted above, if the function is discretionary, 
then a plaintiff cannot nullify the immunity by arguing that the 
decisionmaking process itself was negligent,. Thus, even if there 
was a "negligent" failure to investigate accidents, or even if 
there was a negligent failure to respond to the contractor's 
concerns, this still does not change the fact that barriers were 
left off of the highway as a result of the exercise of UDOT's 
discretion, and UDOT is therefore immune. 
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4. There was no regulation requiring the use of 
barriers in the construction zone. 
UDOT did not have any policy or regulation "requiring" the use 
of barriers in the construction zone. The plaintiffs have asserted 
that such a requirement exists, but they have not presented 
evidence of any such requirement. The closest the plaintiffs come 
to an actual requirement is the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices. But the Manual does not require the use of barriers. 
Instead, the MUTCD states that in a two-way two-lane operation, 
"opposing traffic shall be separated either with portable barriers 
(concrete safety-shape or approved alternate), or with channelizing 
devices throughout the length of the two-way operation. The use of 
striping, raised pavement markers, and complementary signing, 
either alone or in combination is not considered acceptable for 
separation purposes." R. 442 (emphasis added). In other words, 
the MUTCD itself leaves the final decision up to discretion of the 
engineers designing the project. 
Moreover, the plaintiffs' expert's opinion that MUTCD required 
barriers is not enough to defeat summary judgment. The plaintiffs 
essentially are analogizing the MUTCD to a regulation binding on 
UDOT. And the interpretation or application of that regulation is 
a matter of law, not fact. So the mere existence of one witness's 
opinion as to what the MUTCD "requires" will not raise a "genuine 
issue of material fact." Furthermore, Mr. Alcorn's statement that 
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the MUTCD "requires" barriers was obviously a statement of his own 
interpretation as to what would be the best approach, and cannot be 
taken as evidence that such a requirement is actually stated in the 
manual. Mr. Alcorn's opinion would, of course, raise a triable 
issue of fact as to whether UDOT made the best choice in traffic 
separation, but because of the discretionary function immunity, 
that issue is moot.2 
5 . UDOT is entitled to discretionary function immunity 
because policy factors supported its decision to 
use barrels. 
An analysis of the governing cases demonstrates that 
discretionary function immunity does not turn on the presence of 
written reports or high-level debate. Rather, the rule to be 
gleaned from Utah cases is actually fairly simple: where there are 
policy reasons for choosing one course of action over another, 
courts will not second-guess the agency's choice; instead, the 
choice is protected by the discretionary function exception. For 
example, in Keegan the decision not to use a higher barrier was 
supported by policy factors such as the higher cost of replacing 
2Also, contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion, David Kennison, 
a UDOT engineer, most certainly did NOT testify that the factors 
favored the use of barriers over barrels. Instead, he clearly and 
unequivocally stated that, based on all of the considerations 
present, barrels were the preferred method. Kennison Deposition, 
R. 1993:1-10 ("On balance I would have recommended that they do it 
just like they did it."). 
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the barriers, the added delays and inconvenience to drivers, and 
the degree of traffic disruption. 896 P.2d at 624-25. In Duncan, 
the choice not to upgrade the railroad crossing warning device at 
the intersection in question was supported by the need to install 
warning devices at other dangerous crossings. 842 P. 2d at 835. 
And in Rocky Mountain Thrift, the design of the flood control 
system involved "geological, environmental, financial, and urban 
planning and developmental concerns, and financial concerns, just 
to name a few." 784 P.2d at 463. 
In the cases where discretionary function immunity was 
rejected, however, no policy considerations supported the govern-
ment entity's decision. For example, there is no good policy 
reason to leave a fence unrepaired, particularly where that fence 
separates a park and the Jordan River. Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 
919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996). Similarly, there is no reason why the 
state would choose to operate an improperly synchronized traffic 
signal. Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980) . And there 
is no good reason not to use any warning signs to tell a driver 
that a road is about to disappear. Carroll v. State Road 
Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 (1972). 
As set forth above, significant safety reasons supported 
UDOT's decision that barrels would be the optimal method of traffic 
separation in the construction area. Anyone can come back after an 
accident and say that UDOT made the wrong decision, but the fact 
-23-
remains that a decision had to be made. "In essence, UDOT's 
decision involved just the sort of policy-driven weighing of costs 
and benefits that the discretionary function exception was meant to 
protect." Keegan, 896 P.2d at 624. 
6. The choice to use barrels was not merely an 
"operational" decision. 
This court can reject the plaintiffs' suggestion that 
discretionary function immunity is unavailable because UDOT's 
decision regarding the optimal traffic separation method was merely 
an operational decision, simply carrying out the "policy decision" 
to reconstruct the Weber Canyon interstate. First, UDOT notes 
this sort of argument can be made about every decision. That is, 
every policy choice can be characterized as merely the "execution" 
of a higher policy. For example, the decision to construct the 
Weber Canyon interstate would obviously be considered a "policy" 
decision covered by discretionary function immunity. But that 
decision could also be characterized as merely an operational deci-
sion, carrying out the state's policy of "plan[ning], develop[ing], 
construct[ing], and maintain[ing] state transportation systems that 
are safe, reliable, environmentally sensitive, and serve the needs 
of the traveling public, commerce, and industry." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-49-4 (4) . - . 
Thus, the mere characterization of a decision as "carrying out 
a policy" does not defeat discretionary function immunity. Rather, 
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the "operational" versus "policy" distinction turns on the factors 
discussed earlier: whether the decision requires the evaluation of 
broad policy factors. If UDOT had let a knocked-over barrel sit in 
one of the traffic lanes for eight hours, and someone was injured 
as a result, UDOT would not be able to claim discretionary 
immunity. That would be a merely operational matter, for there is 
no good safety or other policy reason why a barrel should be 
allowed to sit in a freeway lane for eight hours. Cf. Nelson 
(decision to ignore breach in fence along Jordan River). But the 
decision to use barrels in the first place was obviously not 
operational under this analysis. 
In fact, this line of reasoning points out another reason why 
UDOT's position is stronger in our case than in Keegan. For in 
Keegan a compelling argument could be made that, once UDOT made the 
"policy decision" to use a concrete barrier in the median, the 
decision as to whether to keep that barrier in compliance with 
safety standards was merely ministerial. UDOT's failure to raise 
those barriers after the overlay projects could easily be seen 
simply as an operational decision carrying out the already-imposed 
policy to have a barrier. But the decision not to raise the 
barriers was held to be discretionary in Keegan, and the choice 
whether to use barriers is discretionary in our case as well. 
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C. Because UDOT is immune from suit under the discretionary 
function exception it is irrelevant whether UDOT made 
the "right" choice regarding the barrels. 
If the act is the type that implicates the exercise of basic 
policy evaluation, judgment and expertise on the part of the 
governmental agency, it qualifies as a discretionary function. The 
plaintiffs essentially argue that UDOT made the "wrong" choice, but 
any such suggestions are irrelevant. Of course, UDOT disputes that 
it made the wrong choice as to the traffic separation method. It 
is terrible that the plaintiffs were involved in such a serious 
accident, but as discussed earlier, using barriers would have 
created a whole new set of accidents, probably even more of them, 
and they could have been just as tragic. But ultimately it is 
irrelevant whether UDOT's decision was correct, for the discretion-
ary function immunity applies either way. Discretionary function 
immunity would have little meaning if it only applied when the 
agency made a "correct" choice, for presumably the correct choice 
would be nonactionable anyway. And, the statute clearly provides 
that the discretionary function immunity applies "whether or not 
the discretion is abused." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1). 
Highways are dangerous. And highways under construction are 
even more dangerous, no matter how the construction is done. UDOT 
was faced with a choice between two evils: the evils presented by 
the use of concrete barriers, or the evils presented by the absence 
of concrete barriers. Either way, there would be dangers; the only 
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way to make a truly "safe" choice would be to close the freeway 
entirely.3 UDOT and its employees weighed those dangers and made 
a choice: no barriers. The plaintiffs are understandably unhappy 
about that choice, but they cannot reasonably deny that a tough 
choice had to be made. 
The purpose of discretionary function immunity is to allow a 
government entity to weigh competing policies and make tough 
choices without being second-guessed by the judicial system. See, 
e.g. , Keegan, 896 P.2d at 623. In this case, if UDOT had chosen to 
use barriers, a Keegan-type accident could easily have occurred, 
and UDOT would likely have been sued for that choice. The Govern-
mental Immunity Act and the case law interpreting it makes clear 
that choices in highway design are best left up to the Department 
of Transportation, and not to juries. Therefore, the trial court 
correctly granted summary judg*^rit in favor of UDOT on the issue of 
the discretionary function immunitv. 
POINT TWO 
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT THEIR INJURIES RESULTED 
FROM UDOT•S ALLEGED FAILURE TO REDUCE THE SPEED LIMITS IN 
THE CONSTRUCTION ZONE. 
Summary judgment was also proper on the plaintiffs' claim that 
3But as the 1-15 construction project demonstrates, even that 
choice would not be safe, because additional traffic would be 
forced onto other roads and cause more accidents that way. 
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UDOT is liable for allegedly failing to reduce the speed limit in 
the canyon. First, setting a speed limit is itself a discretionary 
function, as it, too, requires the balancing of several factors. 
More importantly, however, there is absolutely no evidence that the 
plaintiffs' injuries resulted from UDOT's alleged failure to reduce 
the speed limit. The plaintiffs are entitled to all reasonable 
inferences in their favor, of course, but those inferences have to 
be based on some evidence. The only evidence cited by the plain-
tiffs is the deposition testimony of Mr. Thomas Alcorn, their 
expert witness. But Mr. Alcorn never stated that the accident was 
caused by the failure to change the speed limit signs. Mr. Alcorn 
testified as follows: 
Q: Okay, do you have any information that would 
indicate that speed had anything to do with, and I'm not 
talking about the injuries, but I'm talking about the 
cause of the accident? 
A: Well, certainly it appears that you have a loss 
of control on the outside of a horizontal curve to the 
left, which is an indicator of speed too fast for 
conditions followed by an overcorrection to the left. 
Q: Do you know whether or not that loss of control 
was due to speed or some other factor such as 
intoxication, fatigue or inattentiveness? 
A: I can't tell you how many factors were in it, 
no. 
Q: You have no way to really determine what caused 
the truck driver to veer off to the right? 
Mr. Ferguson: Truck driver? 
Q: (By Mr. Williams) The pickup truck driver, Mr. 
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Griffin. 
A: No, I don't. 
Q: In fact, you would merely be speculating, 
wouldn't you, at this point that speed was one of the 
factors that caused him to drive off the shoulder in the 
road prior to the accident occurring? 
A: A little more than speculation. It's very 
characteristic on our highways throughout the country as 
a causal factor in single vehicle, run-off-the-road 
accidents on the outside of a curve. 
Q: But you're making a general statement, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And it's not based on any particular facts or 
investigation of this case? 
A: I agree. 
Deposition of Thomas Alcorn, R. 2269:4 - 2270:10 (emphasis added). 
In other words, Mr. Alcorn himself admitted that he had no way 
to determine what caused Griffin to veer off to the right and to go 
out of control. He also admitted that while speed may be a causal 
factor in single-car run-off-the-road accidents on curves, he could 
not say that it actually was in this case. It may have been speed, 
or it may have been something else, such as intoxication, fatigue, 
or inattentiveness. And any opinions he did render were "not based 
on any particular facts or investigation of this case." If an 
expert admits that his opinion is "basically speculation," the 
court is justified in disregarding the expert's opinion. See e.g. 
Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 347 (Utah 1996); State v. 
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Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 230 (Utah 1980) ("the general rule regarding 
the certainty of an expert's opinion is that the expert may not 
give an opinion which represents a mere guess, speculation, or 
conjecture.") 
Moreover, even if there had been evidence that speed was a 
"factor," there was no evidence that the driver was actually 
driving at an unsafe speed, or that his speed was in any way 
related to what the speed limit signs said. Thus, it would be pure 
speculation to suggest that UDOT's alleged failure to reduce the 
speed limit proximately caused the plaintiffs' injuries. Summary 
judgment was therefore proper on this theory of recovery as well. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, defendant-appellee UDOT 
hereby requests the court to affirm the summary judgment of the 
trial court dismissing UDOT with prejudice and upon the merits. 
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